How, why, and for whom individual mergers and acquisitions generate net economic benefits becomes an increasingly important policy issue as industries globalize and consolidate. For nonfinancial firms, analysis focuses on two overlapping possibilities: postmerger improvements in efficiency (which benefit firms and customers alike) and increases in market power (which benefit firms at the expense of their less-footloose customers).
In the financial sector, the existence of safety-net subsidies introduces two further sources for concern: opportunity costs generated by individual-country policies of entry or exit resistance and the possibility that the merger or acquisition represents a form of regulatory arbitrage. When policymakers resist the exit or foreign takeovers of inefficient domestic institutions, they subsidize particular firms and increase their market power. Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage occur when, by changing the geographic footprint of their activities, financial institutions (and some of their counterparties) can shift poorly monitored risk exposures to taxpayers in one or another country on advantageous terms (Kane, 2000; Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez, 2008; Campa and Hernando, 2008) . In the absence of explicit procedures for assessing and redressing supervisory failings across countries, such transactions threaten to increase the fragility of financial systems around the world.
Evidence regarding efficiency, market, and regulatory effects of cross-border banking combinations comes mainly from event studies. Researchers first use one or more forms of market-model regression to identify significant shifts in parametric measures of either value or risk-taking at partner banks during or after merger events.
When significant parameter shifts are observed, the estimated shift is regressed on various characteristics of one or the other merger partner and on structural characteristics of the markets, economies, or regulatory systems within which these merged bank" and that banks from "countries with strong supervision" were not trying to escape regulatory discipline in their home countries or to extract safety-net benefits by extending their operations into countries where supervision is weaker.
Although these results are very comforting, they are less than fully convincing. This is because they leave open some critical loose ends. First, neither paper directly estimates or controls for differences in safety-net benefits across countries. Second, while both papers incorporate indirect measures based on differences across countries in the scope of regulatory and supervisory powers, the models used do not and cannot control for variation in the intensity with which authorities monitor individual-bank risk exposures or exercise their enforcement authority when excessive leverage or other forms of inappropriate risk-taking is observed. Third, the possibility that merger partners differ from other banks with respect to the second-stage regressors (i.e., the issue of sample-selection bias) is not explored.
To address these concerns, this paper examines whether and how EU banks that engage in cross-border mergers (CBM banks) differ from other EU banks with respect to the safety-net benefits they extract or how effectively risk-shifting controls restrain their incremental risk-taking. Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008) synthetically estimate differences in safety-net benefits and in supervisory effectiveness for EU-15 countries excluding Greece. These estimates use Hovakimian and Kane's (2000) adaptation of the two-equation model of capital discipline and safety-net control devised by Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) .
Using the same model and the same 1993-2004 Bancscope dataset, this paper shows that --both within and across countries --significant differences exist in risktaking and access to safety-net subsidies between CBM and other commercial banks.
We find smaller, but similar differences between banks that Carbo, Kane and Rodriguez (2008) designate as "country-champion banks" or CC Banks (on the grounds that they are large and complex enough to compete in international markets and politically and administratively difficult to fail and unwind) and other banks in the sample.
1 On average across countries, CBM and CC banks are more leveraged and extract larger safety-net subsidies than other EU banks. More importantly, after CBM institutions complete a cross-border merger, even though their accounts show less leverage, their incremental access to safety-net benefits increases substantially --presumably because they can expand their off-balance-sheet activity or increase portfolio risk. Postmerger effects turn out to be greater at acquirers than at targets and our results prove robust to using a companion Heckman equation to select CBM banks.
The crucial policy implication of our study is that cross-border mergers and individual-country exit resistance contributed to the current global financial turmoil by undermining the effectiveness of capital requirements and other supervisory controls on risk-shifting in EU countries. EU taxpayers, consumers of financial services, and commercial and savings banks competing with CBM institutions must ultimately pay 1 These banks are listed in an appendix to Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008 1977, 1978) . Merton portrays safety-net access as an option that allows bank owners to put the bank to safety-net managers for the face value of the bank's debt. However, we follow Ronn and Verma (1986) in scaling down the price at which examination lags and political pressures allow authorities to enforce their takeover rights. The variable IPP expresses the fair premium for safety-net support per Euro (or per pound) of debt as an increasing function of a bank's asset risk (σ v ) and leverage. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the face value of an institution's debt (B) to the estimated market value of its assets (V).
The contribution of Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) is to recognize that market and regulatory disciplines prevents B/V from being chosen independently of σ v . To control risk-shifting, counterparties and regulators may be expected to require B/V to fall when and as σ v increases. Conveniently treating σ v as the model's only exogenous variable leads to the following reduced-form equations for B/V and IPP:
Equation (1) expresses the idea that regulators and creditors constrain banks to a mutually acceptable set of perceived leverage and volatility pairs. If safety-net managers could observe σ v and control B/V perfectly, they would set B/V so that IPP equaled the value of the sum of explicit and implicit premiums they could impose on the bank. The slope coefficients in (1) and (2) may be interpreted as follows:
By themselves, the positive partial derivatives that are shown in equation (4) tell us how much value bank stockholders could extract from the safety net if managers were free to make unconstrained portfolio adjustments. However, in practice, safety-net officials and important private counterparties have the power to monitor and constrain bank risk taking.
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the sign of β 1 in equation (2) indicates whether, in a country's particular contracting environment, increases in asset volatility can increase the value of the implicit and explicit government guarantees that are imbedded in the bank's stock price. To neutralize risk-shifting incentives at the margin, disciplinary penalties that induce a decline in B/V must be large enough to offset fully whatever increase in IPP would otherwise be generated by choosing a higher σ v .
Empirically, as long as the total derivative β 1 is positive, risk-shifting incentives are not completely neutralized.
Thus, for market and regulatory pressure to discipline and potentially to neutralize incremental risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met:
Bank capital increases with volatility:
Guarantee values do not rise with volatility:
None of the three variables featured in our equations is directly observable.
However, Marcus and Shaked (1984) show how to use option-based models of deposit insurance to track these variables synthetically. The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure is to obtain tracking values for V and σ v by numerical methods. These values are then used to estimate IPP as the value of a put option on bank assets. A key step is to use Îto's lemma to link σ v to σ E , the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns.
II. A Preliminary Look at the Focal Variables
To identify cross-border merging banks, we use the Thompson One-Banker M&A database for the European Union. This source permits us to identify target and acquirer banks. We also require that the selected mergers be registered as completed deals in the European Central Bank registry of banks. Balance-sheet and income statement data for the merging banks come from the Bankscope database. Except for Spain and Germany, CBM banks extract higher mean benefits from country EU safety nets than other banks do. Leverage is higher for CBM banks in threefourths of the cases, while increases and decreases in asset volatility divide almost equally. Table 2 shows separately for all banks and for CBM banks that leverage, fair premiums, and asset volatility differ significantly for most country pairs. This supports the hypothesis that selectively extending a bank's operations into another EU country can indeed lower the firm's overall regulatory burden. For example, a bank can book risk exposures on which a home country enforces a high effective capital requirement in subsidiaries located in countries that treat these particular exposures less onerously. Tables 3 and 4 aggregate the data globally. Table 3 shows that the link between debt ratios and risk-taking is on average more closely policed at country-champion and CBM banks than for other banks. Without such policing (i.e., if α 1 were ≥ 0), equation (4) shows that the correlation between B/V and IPP could not be negative. Table 4 establishes that on average CBM banks achieve slightly and insignificantly higher leverage and safety-net benefits than CC banks do, while other banks trail significantly in both respects. It also shows that, after a cross-border merger, leverage and safety-net benefits increase substantially.
III. Evidence that Cross-Border Mergers Offer Partner Institutions Incremental Regulatory Relief and Safety-Net Benefits
Our next array of tables explore a series of difference-on-difference regression equations in which errors are clustered at the individual-bank level. The first column of Table 5 shows that across the 12 sample countries, accounting capital is subject to less and less discipline as asset size increases. However, although CBM banks receive more discipline, the second column shows that this discipline does not prevent them from extracting incremental safety-net benefits. At the margin, CBM banks find ways to expand their portfolio risk that extract safety-net subsidies. Table 6 contrasts CBM banks' pre-merger and post-merger experience, suppressing the size term. It shows that, although accounting capital is policed roughly twice as closely after a cross-border merger, CBM banks' incremental access to safetynet benefits doubles. Wald tests confirm that these differences are highly significant. Table 7 indicates that discipline and benefits accrue differently at target and acquiring banks. Although acquiring banks (who presumably initiate cross-border deals) face significantly more capital discipline, they extract significantly more safety-net benefit at the margin than targets do. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that the pursuit of safety-net benefits help to motivate cross-border merger activity.
IV. Controlling for the Effects of Selection Bias
A growing empirical literature seeks to predict individual firms' propensity to engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in a time-series, cross-section framework. Among other things, this literature emphasizes the role of size and relative profit performance as motives for banks to combine. This leads us to hypothesize that targets or acquirers might be especially large and might be responding to changes in their safety-net benefits when a cross-border deal is initiated. In Table 8 , the negative sign that ∆IPP receives in predicting year-by-year cross-border activity among CBM banks confirms the hypothesis that --as the Regulatory Dialectic would predict --declines in the size of incremental safety-net benefits tend to call forth a benefitrestoring response from CBM banks. This suggests the usefulness of modeling a bank's willingness to combine with a cross-border partner in any year in a two-equation framework. We do this by introducing the Mills odds ratio from time-series or corsssection Heckman selection equations into our baseline models. This ratio lets us sort out the effects of a bank's leverage and access to safety-net benefits from the influence of asset size and other potential M&A determinants on a bank's decision to participate in a cross-border deal.
Hernando, Nieto, and Wall (2008) survey the literature on bank takeovers. An overarching theme of this research is that acquisitions should transfer control of assets from poorly managed targets to better managed acquirers. We amend this sentiment to underscore the possibility that the management of safety-net benefits may be a key concern. Ahern and Weston (2007) stress that firms that engage in successful merger and acquisition (M&A) programs do so over many years as a way of confronting various challenges posed by their economic environments. Carletti, Hartmann, and
Ongena (2007) stress that such challenges include differences in the transparency and effectiveness of prudential and competition controls on M&A activities. To account for environmental differences, the expanded versions of equations (1) and (2) reported in this section incorporate country fixed effects. Table 8 reports year-by-year and pooled equations for selecting CBM banks To account for the potential endogeneity of any classificatory variable, we adopt
Heckman's procedure (1976, 1978) . This introduces into our previous models a variable
Heckman calls "Lambda." This variable is also known as Mill's inverse odds ratio ("Mills ratio"). It measure the covariance between the error terms of the single-equation regression for an endogenous variable with the residuals from the selection equation. In our tables, the coefficient assigned to the Mills ratio measures how "surprising" it is to learn that a particular bank is either engaging in a cross-border merger or (in Tables 11 and 13) acquiring a bank in another country.
In Table 9 , Lambda proves significantly negative in both panels. This indicates that incremental leverage and safety-net benefits are algebraically larger, the less surprising it seems for a particular bank to be engaging in a cross-border M&A.
Compared to the estimates shown in Table 5 , other coefficients move up or down by only one or two points at the third decimal place. Table 7 indicates that safety-net benefits increase significantly more at acquirers than at targets. Within the class of CBM banks, Table 10 capitalization exerts a hard-to-interpret negative influence on the acquisition decision. Table 11 expands on the experiment reported in Table 7 . It introduces the Mills ratio that emerges from using the pooled equation in Table 10 . While other coefficients are not much affected, the more likely (i.e., the less surprising) it is for a particular bank to be the acquirer, the less incremental capital discipline it faces and the more safety-net benefits it can extract. We interpret this to mean that investors and creditors recognize that EU banks with an established cross-border acquisition program are adept at creating value through regulatory arbitrage.
Allowing for sample-selection bias, Tables 12 and 13 report the outcomes of two final regression experiments. Table 12 investigates whether and how risk-shifting behavior at CBM banks varies before and after a cross-border merger. The coefficient of the Mills ratio is always negative, but becomes much larger and more significant after the transaction than it was before. Unsurprising combinations attract less capital and supervisory discipline than surprising ones. Although, other things equal, postmerger discipline grows with the size of the resulting conglomerate, incremental benefits from expanding asset risk increase as well. Table 13 contrasts the behavior of leverage and safety-net benefits at acquirers and targets prior to the cross-border transaction using Heckman's two-equation framework. Other things equal, target-bank access to incremental safety-net benefits (i.e., the coefficient of ∆σ v ) is twice that of acquirers. Taken together with our other results, this suggests that CBM acquirers identify targets that possess unexploited opportunities for extracting safety-net benefits.
V. Summary Implications
This paper confirms two complementary and worrisome hypotheses about the purposes that led EU banks to undertake cross-border M&A activity during our 1993-2004 sample period. Regression evidence suggests first that these banks were not responding to opportunities for increasing their operating efficiency, at least as measured conventionally by their expense ratios. Instead, statistical analysis indicates that these banks were responding principally to opportunities for shifting risk onto EU safety nets. What makes this form of arbitrage hard to supervise is that safety-net benefits appear to strengthen a country's banks in the short run. However, over time, policies that do not adequately monitor and discipline merger-created safety-net benefits end up subsidizing risk-taking and dangerously increasing the fragility of country's banking system to disruptive movements in the prices of important bank assets.
Authorities must recognize that the existing framework for supervising cross-border M&A activity at EU banks has failed to monitor and control forms of regulatory arbitrage that shift risk onto national safety nets. Not just in the EU but throughout our globalizing economy, efforts to re-work this framework deserve great priority. 
TABLE 1 MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS (B/V), MEAN FAIR PREMIUM (IPP), AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF RETURN ON ASSETS (σ σ σ σ V ): ALL BANKS VS. CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS

MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN B/V ACROSS COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS The test is the p-value of a one-tailed t-test on equal means in both groups
TABLE 2B. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN IPP ACROSS COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS The test is the p-value of a one-tailed t-test on equal means in both groups
(1)
Belgium (2) 0.008 -
Denmark (3) 0.222 0.009 -
Finland (4) 0.008 0.555 0.008 -
Luxembourg ( 
Netherlands (6) 0.112 0.009 0.652 0.006 0.007 -
Portugal (7 
Germany (14) 0 
Belgium (2) 0.032 -
Denmark (3) 0.004 0.005 -
Finland (4) 0.009 0.009 0.008 -
Netherlands (6) 0.299 0.321 0.005 0.010 0.014 -
Portugal ( 
Sweden ( 
Ireland ( 
France ( 
Italy ( 
Germany ( 
TABLE 2C. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN σ σ σ σ V ACROSS COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS
The test is the p-value of a one-tailed t-test on equal means in both groups
TABLE 2D. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN B/V ACROSS COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS The test is the p-value of a one-tailed t-test on equal means in both groups
Denmark ( 
Netherlands (6) 0.006 0.006 --0.006 -
TABLE 2E. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN IPP ACROSS COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS The test is the p-value of a one-tailed t-test on equal means in both groups
TABLE 2F. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN σ σ σ σ V ACROSS COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS
Belgium (2) 0.019 -
Luxembourg (5) 0.008 0.009 ---
Netherlands (6) 0.010 0.010 --0.011 -
Belgium (2) 0.004 -
Netherlands (6) 0.004 0.324
TABLE 5 SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROL IN THE EU-12 INCLUDING ASSET SIZE AS A REGRESSOR
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V .
B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. The errors are clustered at the firm level 
TABLE 6 PRE-AND POST-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING BEHAVIOUR AT CROSS-
BORDER MERGING BANKS Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V .
B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The first entries of the second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. POST-MERGER PERIODS (p-value) 0.004 0.003
Pre-Merger
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆(B/V) ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆IPP ∆σ V -0
TABLE 7 PRE-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS:
ACQUIRING VS. ACQUIRED BANKS Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V .
B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. Errors are clustered at the firm level ACQUIRED CBM BANKS Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V .
B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. Errors are clustered at the firm level 
